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THOSE WHO HAVE ATTEMPTED to provide an explanation for the decline of the 
Maritime shipping and shipbuilding industries have commonly based their analysis 
on technological change. According to the technological argument, the decline was 
caused by Maritimers' incapability to make the shift from sail and wooden vessels 
to steam and steel-hulled ships. Eric Sager and Gerald Panting in Maritime 
Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914 (Montreal/ 
Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990) provide an alternative 
explanation. They argue that the demise of the shipbuilding and shipping industries 
cannot be understood as "a single catastrophic event, but as part of a structure 
possessing its own stability and durability, constraining economic development 
today, as it did a century ago" (p. 4). Sager and Panting suggest that in order to 
understand what happened to the sailing ship industries, and to the Maritime 
economy more generally, we need to look at the structure and process of the 
Maritime economy in which these industries were embedded. 
Sager and Panting work from the evidence collected by the Maritime History 
Group at Memorial University. According to this evidence, shipbuilding and 
shipping developed in the Maritimes as an "enclave industry". An enclave industry 
refers to an industry which is established by external investors with most of the 
inputs and outputs being controlled outside the region. Contact between the 
Maritimes and the outside was mediated by merchants. By being positioned at the 
axis of exchange between local needs and export sales, merchants were able to 
dominate and control economic activities, shape socio-economic possibilities and 
restrict development in particular ways. 
Sager and Panting are guided in this work by the theoretical insights of the 
staple theory. According to the staple theory, economic activity of a region or 
colony is determined by the staple, that is, the resource available for export from 
the hinterland to the metropolis. This economic activity encourages the local 
production of goods to replace imports from other areas. The colony's economy 
then diversifies beyond its export base and into a self-sustained growth. i In the case 
of the Maritimes, why did self-sustained growth not happen? In the process of 
answering this question, Sager and Panting extend the staple theory by pointing 
out the importance of understanding the social and political as well as economic 
structures surrounding shipping and shipbuilding and the historical processes which 
created these structures. 
While focusing on shipping and shipbuilding, Sager and Panting argue that 
their explanation of what happened to sailing ship industries is consistent with an 
explanation of what happened to the region's economy generally. Although the 
shipping and shipbuilding industries began from linkages to fish and timber, and 
subsequently generated secondary industries, these secondary industries collapsed as 
marine industries declined and the economy fell back into staple dependency. By 
developing an understanding of the structure and process involved in one sector of 
1 See Rosemary Ommer, From Outpost to Outport: A Structural Analysis of the Jersey-Gaspé Cod 
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the 19th-century economy of the region, we are able to acquire an understanding of 
why the region continues to be on the periphery of industrial development. 
To understand Maritime history, Sager and Panting suggest that we need to go 
beyond examining staple linkages to explore also how demand for Maritime goods 
was influenced by wars, trading opportunities in the West Indies and British 
policies. Shipbuilding and shipping were part of a mercantile economy which 
consisted of staple trading, importing local needs, wholesaling, retailing and the 
production of ships. The ships were used to move goods from where they could be 
obtained cheaply to a market where they could be sold or exchanged profitably. 
Sager and Panting point out that merchants were often shipowners, but they were 
traders of goods first and shipowners second. In other words, their primary interest 
was in cheap freight rates and high profits from exchanging goods. The shipping 
industry developed in the hands of a particular group -- the merchants -- and their 
search for profits within an export economy in which the merchants maintained 
control over distribution and exchange. The decline of the industry also occurred 
within this same context. 
Sager and Panting make a distinction between merchant and industrial capital 
and the different consequences on development strategies of these two forms of 
capital. Merchant capital is the product of exchanging goods, while industrial 
capital is the product of industrial processes and wage labour. Merchants acquire 
economic surpluses by controlling exchange relations and pricing, and they have 
little interest in expropriating the small landholders from the means of subsistence. 
On the other hand, industrial capitalism cannot develop until labourers are 
separated from the means of subsistence and required to sell their labour to the 
owners of the means of production for wages which they use to purchase their 
needs. The mercantile economy resulted in labour working part-time in staple or 
ship industries and part-time in petty commodity production. Sager and Panting 
refer to this strategy by labour as an "occupational pluralism" which represented 
not only a way of acquiring basic needs but also a defence against becoming 
dependent on wages (p. 193). They argue that occupational pluralism was also a 
factor constraining industrial development in the region. 
In general Sager and Panting see the decline of the ship industry as the 
consequence of the inability of Maritime merchants to see their interests being 
served by working towards making the shift from wood and sail to steam and steel. 
Instead, Maritime merchants appeared to be beaten by their own pessimism as they 
pulled capital out of marine industries and diverted investments to landward 
opportunities. Ultimately Sager and Panting see the decline of Maritime shipping 
and shipbuilding as the only possible outcome of the historical and structural 
conditions that existed in the Maritime economy in the 19th century. Merchants 
represented the socially, politically and economically powerful class in the region 
in this period. They were the only ones who could have brought about changes in 
state policy and furnished the large amounts of capital necessary to make the 
switch from sail to steam. Had the merchants been able to develop the vision of 
profits in steel shipbuilding, they not only would have made the shift from 
merchant to industrial capitalist, but they also would have laid the foundation for 
industrial development in the region. As a consequence of their failure, the 
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merchants' power disappeared with the end of mercantilism and the region has 
remained on the fringe of industrial development. 
What can we learn from this account? At one level the research represents dense 
and detailed description of many aspects of the shipping and shipbuilding 
economy. However, their analysis also examines the role of human agency. The 
merchant class as the bearer of regional economic interests, according to Sager and 
Panting, must be assigned the blame for the decline of the region's ship industries. 
Merchants failed to transcend the mercantile ideology and develop the values and 
ideas of industrial capitalism. In addition, Sager and Panting also offer insights 
into some of the other impacts of merchant capital. Under merchant capital, for 
example, labour was not separated from the means of subsistence, and this made it 
more difficult for industry to find wage labourers. In addition, the importation of 
foodstuffs at low prices denied the region's farmers a larger local market, and this 
resulted in the persistence of small-scale and labour-intensive farms. Sager and 
Panting also make explicit the role the state played in the original success of 
shipping and how it failed to help make the transition to steam. After reading this 
account one is left with serious doubts as to the ability of entrepreneurs to represent 
the long-term economic interests of the region. Their short-term strategies for 
maximizing profits require different goals and even conflict with the long-term 
economic stability of the Maritimes. 
While Sager and Panting provide answers to many questions, their work also 
raises questions. To what extent should we assume that the region's merchants were 
able to act autonomously, or were they restricted in their actions by ties to British 
capital? If one of the factors causing the lack of industrial development in the 
region was the shortage of "free" labour, why was there a large emigration of men 
and women to the New England states?2 Did the merchants in other regions or 
nations make a more successful transition to becoming industrial capitalists? To 
what extent was the failure of Maritime merchants due to the formation of a new 
hegemony forming in Central Canada which found its expression in Confederation 
and the National Policy? And finally, are Sager and Panting correct to argue 
implicitly that industrial capitalist development is the only appropriate model? 
Maritime Capital may be overly deterministic in its final conclusions, but this 
book is absolutely necessary reading for anyone interested in Maritime develop-
ment. In the end the book does leave me wondering as to how the present 
generation of Maritimers will set about the task of making their own history in a 
manner that could permit them to overcome the failures of the past. 
DARRELL McLAUGHLIN 
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